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-SUPREME COURT REPORT

Pleading the Fourth
Plaintiffs may be able to sue under seizure law in high-speed chases
BY KATHRYN R. URBONYA

ference to a confined individual's serious medThe U.S. Supreme Court
ical needs is shocking
recently erected a nearly insurconduct, according to
mountable roadblock to lawsuits
the Court. Deliberate inunder the 14th Amendment for
difference to the risk of
injuries or deaths caused by
injury during a highhigh-speed police chases. But
speed pursuit is not.
some plaintiffs may have a way
The difference bearound that obstacle.
tween these two scenarThe Court's May ruling in
ios is that the pursuing
County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
police officer has little
118 S. Ct. 1708, held that the
time to reflect before
14th Amendment, which proacting. As a result, only
tects an individual's liberty, immalice will suffice to
poses liability only if pursuing
prove shocking conduct
officers acted maliciously, with
in a high-speed pursuit.
an intent to hurt the pursued.
The next avenue
But plaintiffs may be able
· for litigation is the
to pursue another theory of liaFourth Amendment. To
,bility. If a police chase amounts
challenge a pursuit unto an unreasonable seizure-if
der it, plaintiffs must
an officer intentionally rams a
prove there was a seisuspect's vehicle and causes a
zure-a difficult taskcrash, for example-the plain- Because quick decisions must be made during a vehicular
and that it was unreatiff may be able to sue for the pursuit, malice must be proven on the part of the police.
sonable.
Fourth Amendment violation.
Two High Court
It seems that driving skills what it is and why it was not ap- cases make clear that a Fourth
matter when police are seeking a plied last year in Washington v. Amendment seizure is no accident.
shield from liability. Better to have Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, which In Brower v. County of Inyo, 489
an accident, as the facts in Lewis held there was no substantive due U.S. 593 (1989), the justices held
illustrate.
process right to physician-assisted that use of a police roadblock to
The plaintiffs in the case lost suicide.
not because they lacked good
The difference between
facts, but because of the Court's the decisions may be their
stance on substantive due process authors. Chief Justice Wilclaims under the 14th Amendment. liam H. Rehnquist relied on
history and precedent to reNo Helmets and a Refusal to Stop
ject a substantive due proA Sacramento County, Calif., cess right to die in Gluckspolice officer spotted two boys at berg.
night riding a motorcycle without
Justice David H. Souter,
helmets. He ,gave chase because he in contrast, relied on neither
thought the youths had refused to reject the 14th Amendanother officer's command to stop. ment claim in Lewis. Instead
The 1.3-mile pursuit hit speeds up he added a new liability reto 100 miles per hour before the quirement-the officers' acmotorcycle stalled and the officer's tions must be shocking. This
car hit the passenger, killing him.
condition applies to chalThe officer's actions failed to lenges to executive action
meet the Court's "shocks the con- but not to legislation, which
science" test. In adopting the stan- was at issue in Glucksberg.
dard, the Court tried to explain
Under the shock-theconscience test, plaintiffs must stop the driver of a stolen autoKathryn R. Urbonya is a pro- prove that executive officials acted mobile qualifies as a seizure. But
fessor at the College of William and egregiously. What constitutes such the Court found no seizure in
Mary School of Law in Williams- conduct depends upon whether offi- California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.
burg, Va. She is a member of STOPP, cials were forced to make a quick 621 (1991), when a fleeing youth,
an organization designed to limit decision.
chased by an officer on foot, tossed
high-speed police pursuits.
For example, deliberate indif- away a rock of crack cocaine.
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AuthoritY" on Workers' Compensation.
Under the holdings of these
cases, officers must intentionally
use means that in fact stop the pursued person. Courts use an objective test to determine intent, asking whether a reasonable officer
would have thought that the means
applied would cause a stop.

Winners and Losers In Seizure Cases
Distinguishing accidents from
intentional acts can challenge the
most creative lawyers. Here are
some winning and losing arguments
on what constitutes a seizure:
• Loser: Police stayed with a
pursued driver, knowing a crash
was likely. Brower suggests that no
seizure occurs in this situation.
• Loser: The officers followed
too closely, knowing there was not
enough room to stop if the pursued
lost control. In Lewis, the plaintiff
alleged that the police officer
was only 100 feet away when he
When it comes to the most authoritative, comprehensive and accurate information
needed 650 feet to stop at his rate
on Workers' Compensation law, there's only one Authority. From the company that
of speed. The Court implicitly rehas provided attorneys with the brightest minds in law for more than a century.
jected this argument.
Contact your Matthew Bender representative
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• Possible winner: Officers
or ealll- 800-223 -1940.
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intentionally sideswiped the pursued's car. United States v. $32,400
Circle 41 on Reader Service Card
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Cir. 1996), said a seizure occurs if
contact between vehicles stops the
pursued auto.
• Possible winner: Officers
shot at the car. In Cole v. Bone, 9!;)3
F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1993), the court
COURT REPORTERS, INC.
held such gUnfire is a seizure if
the driver stops as a result.
• Possible winner: Police used
a rolling roadblock, surrounding
the pursued vehicle with their
cruisers and gradually slowing it
down. The pursued crashes or voluntarily stops. The latter is a
seizure, but whether the former is
depends upon the evidence. In
White v. Tamlyn, 961 F. Supp. 1047
Full Reporting Services,
(E.D. Mich. 1997), the court held no
Including:
seizure occurred when there was
no evidence of an intent to stop the
• Video Conferencing
pursued by physical impact.
• Video Depositions
• Possible winner: Police used
a stationary roadblock. A stop· de• Conference Rooms
termines whether a seizure oc• Realtime Transcription
curred. Brower suggests that crashUsing CaseView®
ing into the roadblock will not
nullify the seizure, unless the road200 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 300
block was small and did not. effecChicago, Illinois 60601-1014
tively bar further travel.
High-speed pursuits are costly.
(Toll-Free) 1-800-McCorkle
Not only do insurance premiums
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rise, but people also die. In time, lit(In Chicago) (312) 263-0052 (Fax) 312-263-7494
igation under the Fourth AmendWWW.MCDEP.COM
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A Constitutional Siesta

Court focuses on statutory interpretation and common law
BY DEBRA CASSENS

It was a relatively quiet term
on the constitutional front.
As the U.S. Supreme Court issued a last-minute flurry of rulings
in late June, the news was mostly
about statutory development.
Interpreting four federal laws,
the justices gave new protections
to victims of workplace harassment
and those with disabling medical
conditions, but it made lawsuits
more difficult for sexually abused
students and citizens claiming some
government civil rights violations.
Even Swidler & Berlin v. United States, which held that communications between a lawyer and
client remain privileged after the
client's death, was about development of common law.

Skirting the Big Issues
Despite the huge potential impact of those rulings on ordinary
people, there wasn't much to make
a con law professor's heart go pitterpatter. Out of 95 opinions,
there were no religion
cases, no federalism

cases and-with the last-minute
settlement of a white teacher's suit
against a Piscataway, N.J., school
board-no affirmative action cases.
There were only two rulings
on free speech: NEA u. Finley, which
permitted the National Endowment
for the Arts to consider decency
when awarding arts grants, and
Arkansas Educational Television
Commission v. Forbes, which permitted public television stations
to exclude minor-party candidates
from televised debates.
The sleeper term is in stark
contrast to the 1996-97 term, when
the Court struck down laws protecting religious liberty, requiring
state background checks of gun
buyers and barring indecency on
the Internet.
"Maybe the theme of this term
is that the Court is sitting back and
letting the nation react to some of
the more ambitious decisions of the
prior year," suggests Neal Devins, a
law professor with the College of
William and Mary's law school.

The justices appear to be taking a breather at a time some members of Congress have been complaining of judicial activism. "Once
the dust settles the Court may be
willing to pursue things in a more
venturesome way," he says.
Akhil Reed Amar, a professor
at Yale Law School, prefers to analyze the term in the larger context.
Looking at the past few years, he
sees a Court that is, well, increasingly cocky in overruling co-equal
branches of government.
"Judicial review occurs all the
time but typically against state and
local government, not against acts
of Congres~," Amar says. "This is
a Court that, by historical standards, thinks very well of its interpretive confidence vis-a-vis the other branches."
That attitude was wo"\[en into
the Court's biggest constitutional
ruling of the term, Clinton u. City of
New York, which struck down the
line-item veto, he says.

Amar is also watching another
trend: the Court's general reluctance to extend the Warren Court's
pro-defendant rulings. In the last
half-dozen years or so, Amar can't
recall any case in which the Court
excluded evidence that was alleged
to have been illegally seized.
The pattern continued last
term, when the Court ruled in
Pennsylvania Board of Probation v.
Scott that the exclusionary rule
does not apply to parole revocation
hearings. Another anti-defense ruling, United States v. Balsys, held
that the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply if the
suspect cites only a fear of foreign
prosecution.
The criminal rulings were part
of a term in which the Court just
seemed to be doing less, says Ronald Rotunda, a law professor at the
University of Illinois College of Law.
"On the whole it was a relatively
quiet year," he says.
Commentators are split on
whether the uneventful term was by
design or happenstance. In Devins'
view, the Court purposefully avoided controversy. "It made a decision
that it didn't want to go out of its
way to bring issues to the fore."
But to Erwin Chemerinsky, a
professor at the University of Southern California

Law Center, it is wrong to assume
the justices act with a unified purpose. "In reality cert grants are the
product offour individual votes," he
points out.
Besides, the Court had been
willing to jump back into the affirmative action fray in Piscataway
Board of Education v. Taxman. It
was brought by a white teacher
challenging a school board decision
to preserve diversity by laying her
off instead of a black teacher. The
plaintiff dropped the case after she
accepted a six-figure settlement collected by civil rights groups.

Numbers Tell the Storv
Left with few constitutional
rulings to explore, Court pundits
are watching individual justices and
charting the ideological divides.
They note that Justice Anthony M. Kennedy is surpassing Justice Sandra Day O'Connor as the
swing vote on the Court, and that
conservative Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas are parting ways in more cases.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Kennedy had the closest
voting relationship this past term,
highlighting the chief justice's
movement toward
the center, says
Tom Gold-

stein of Boies & Schiller in Washington, D.C., an adjunct law professor with American University's law
school who collects Court statistics.
His numbers show that Kennedy was in the majority in 13 of
16 cases decided on a 5-4 vote. Out
of 95 cases, Kennedy or O'Connor
were in the majority in 94. "It's almost impossible to win without one
of those two voting with you," Goldstein says.
In the 1995-96 and 1996-97
terms, Thomas and Scalia were on
the same side in all 5-4 decisions.
But last term they were on opposite
sides in four such cases, including
U.S. v. Bajakajian in which Thomas joined the majority in finding
a forfeiture to be constitutionally
excessive. In the other decisions,
Scalia dissented in favor of criminal
· defendants based on statutory interpretation.
All in all, the Court was fairly
cohesive, issuing 9-0 rulings in 4 7
cases. Rotunda, who is also a special consultant to independent counsel Kenneth Starr, wonders if some
of the unanimous decisions reversing lower courts are evidence of appellate activism. "This is bad news
for litigants because it creates more
uncertainty in the law if .... judges
read Supreme Court opinions so
differently."
On the other hand, some lower
courts may be missing changes in
the law because the Court is issuing stealth opinions. "The Supreme
Court is not flamboyantly announcing these larger trends," says Amar.
While the Court did clear up
some confusion last term-in statutory rulings like Faragher v. Boca
Raton arid Burlington v. Ellerththere will be plenty of questions left
for the lower courts to decide.
Those two High Court decisions made clear that employers
are vicariously liable for sexual harassment by supervisors, even if
there is no tangible harm. Companies can claim an affirmative defense, though, if they took reasonable steps to prevent the harassment and the employee unreasonably failed to use those mechanisms.
But Chemerinsky asks who
qualifies as a supervisor? What
policies to prevent the harassment
are sufficient? He and others will
watch the legal developments at
the same time they await the next
blockbuster constitutional case.
The last term could simply be the
calm before the storm.
•
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